Prompt injection becomes command execution
The model cannot reliably distinguish your instruction from hostile text inside a page, issue, document, email, or tool response.
P0 · CONTAIN
Your coding agent reads a poisoned README or support ticket, then uses shell, GitHub, cloud, or browser tools under a founder’s identity. One person’s broad access becomes the blast radius.
Cornell Tech’s WARP research found a single Reddit comment could steer deep-research agents; Reddit supplied 54–71% of the user-generated content retrieved in tests. Separately, a ReFi Hub founder’s firsthand account described executing a malicious command surfaced in Claude.
The founder incident is self-reported, not a published forensic report.
- Default agents to read-only; require approval for shell, write, network, and credential use.
- Run external content in a separate context from tool instructions.
- Add five hostile-document tests to CI and log every tool call.